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Consider the story of Joe. Joe has dated Mary for three years. He is in love with Mary and 
always dreamed of the day that he could start a family with her, as he adored children. He knew 
that Mary was technically still married to her husband, Tom, but Mary always said they were 
planning on divorcing soon and they lived apart. Joe was absolutely delighted when Mary told 
him that she was pregnant with his child, despite the fact that they were not yet married. Joe was 
excited about the future birth of his child. Abruptly, only a few months into her pregnancy, Mary 
announced she was leaving Joe. In fact, she decided that she would rather settle down with Tom 
and forget about getting the divorce. Just a few months later, the child was born. Though ex-
tremely disheartened that his relationship with Mary was over, Joe still wanted to be the best 
possible parent to his child. However, because Tom and Mary were married when Mary had the 
baby, Tom was considered the legal parent of the child under the marital presumption. Joe is now 
faced with an uphill battle to try to establish paternity and get paternal rights to the child – a for-
merly impossible task in Michigan, but now simply an improbable one. This is Joe’s plight of the 
putative child. 
The paternity of a child can be established in a variety of ways. One of the oldest meth-
ods used to establish paternity is through the use of the marital presumption. The marital pre-
sumption, a common law doctrine adopted by many states, declares that a child born to a married 
woman is a child of the marriage. This presumption can be rebutted, but under very limited cir-
cumstances, meaning the actual biological father may have no way of establishing paternity. 
Many states have inconsistently adopted, reformed, or altered this presumption through statute, 
and Michigan belatedly did so in June of 2012 with the Revocation of Paternity Act (RPA).1 Alt-
                                                
1  MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.1441 (2012); 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts 159 available at 
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2011-2012/publicact/pdf/2012-PA-0160.pdf. 




hough the RPA is a step in the right direction, it does not provide the putative father2 (the man 
attempting to prove paternity), a sufficient opportunity to establish parenthood, and it should be 
modified. Additionally, all statutes that carry forth the presumption are outdated in a changing 
and technologically advanced society, and the presumption should be reformed.  
In Part I, the paper will first describe paternity establishment in general, including detail-
ing the presumption, current law, and various state approaches. Part II will speak of Michigan’s 
law before and after the RPA. Part III will analyze the problems with the RPA. Finally, Part IV 
will suggest possible modifications to the RPA and solutions to the presumption problem in gen-
eral.  
I.  PATERNITY ESTABLISHMENT 
A.  Paternity In General 
 Under common law, a biological father had no right to bring a paternity suit and had no 
standing in a proceeding to determine custody of a child, as the mother’s rights were consistently 
held to be superior to the rights of the biological father.3 Paternity laws were eventually reformed 
under the belief that children benefit from the support of both parents, and lawmakers wanted a 
child to have two legal parents responsible for the child’s upbringing.4  Paternity establishment 
turned into a civil proceeding regulated by federal law, with the goal to provide all children with 
monetary support from that child’s father.5 
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PWORA), states that 
paternity can be established when either parent brings a paternity suit at any time until the child 
                                                
2 Note that Michigan now refers to a putative father as an “alleged father.” 
3 Tiana M. Hinnant, Family Law-Lovers' Triangle Turns Bermuda Triangle: The Natural Father's Right to 
Rebut the Marital Presumption-Michael H. v. Gerald D, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 617, 623 (1990). 
4 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, H.T. 3734, 104th Congress 
(1995-1996). 
5 Id. 




attains age eighteen or when both parents acknowledge paternity.6 The act may require genetic 
testing. Though PWORA is primarily a funding act covering child support collection issues, the 
Act was one of the first to establish paternity guidelines, motivated by the child support payor 
that would be established through a paternity proceeding.7 
There are many different ways that paternity can be established or by which a man may be 
deemed to be a child’s legal father. Different methods include simple genetic testing; a Volun-
tary Acknowledge of Parentage (VAP), an admission by a man that he is the father if there is no 
other presumed father; adoption, registry; the creation of a “social father,” where a man holds 
himself out as the father and others are estopped from denying his parental rights; and the marital 
presumption.8 
B.  The Marital Presumption 
One of the primary ways in which paternity was established under the common law was 
through the marital presumption.9 The marital presumption dates as far back as the 1700’s, where 
English common law held that a child born to a married couple was presumed to be the child of 
that couple.10  The only way the mother and presumed father could rebut that presumption was 
by proving that the husband had no access to his wife during the period of conception.11 Howev-
er, this was nearly impossible to do, because the person disputing the presumption would have to 
                                                
6 Id. 
7 Id. In Fact, requiring states to adopt stronger measures to establish paternity is one of PWORA’s five 
major goals in its reformation of the child support program. The five goals are: 1) automating many child support 
enforcement procedures; 2) establishing uniform tracking procedures; 3) strengthening interstate child support 
enforcement; 4) requiring States to adopt stronger measures to establish paternity; and 5) creating new and stronger 
enforcement tools to increase actual child support collections. Id. 
8 See Paternity Establishment, DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES (2013), http://www.michigan.gov/dhs/0,4562,7-
124-5528_61204_41278---,00.html. 
9 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 US 110 (1989). 
10 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF EVID. IN CIVIL CASES § 97(96) (1913). 
11 Id. 




prove total lack of access, such as the man’s location overseas.12 By the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, many states retained the presumption, but slightly expanded the types of evidence ad-
missible to rebut the presumption.13  However, this expansion still required evidence such as the 
presumed father’s impotence or sterility, meaning it was still rare that a putative father could of-
fer evidence to rebut the presumption.14 
The signature marital presumption case was decided by the United States Supreme Court in 
Michael H. v. Gerald D.15 in 1988. In Michael H., a child, Victoria, was born to Carole D., who 
was married to and lived with Gerald.16 Gerald was listed as the father on Victoria’s birth certifi-
cate and Gerald had always claimed Victoria as his daughter.17 However, blood tests showed a 
98.07% probability that Michael H., with whom Carole had an affair, was actually Victoria’s fa-
ther.18  During the first three years of Victoria’s life, Victoria and Carole sometimes lived with 
Michael, who held her out as his own, and sometimes lived with Gerald, with whom she has 
lived with since.19  Michael filed a filiation action to establish his paternity and right to visita-
tion.20  The court granted Gerald’s motion for summary judgment, finding no triable issues under 
California’s application of the marital presumption, which provides that “a child born to a mar-
ried woman living with her husband, who is neither impotent nor sterile, is presumed to be a 
child of the marriage, and [] this presumption may be rebutted only by the husband or wife, and 
                                                
12 Theresa Glennon, Somebody's Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Presumption of Paternity, 
102 W. VA. L. REV. 547, 562 (2000). 
13 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF EVID. IN CIVIL CASES § 97(96) (1913). 
14 Patricia Bundschuh Blumberg, Human Leukocyte Antigen Testing: Technology Versus Policy in Cases of 
Disputed Parentage, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1587, 1603 (1983). 
15 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 









then only in limited circumstances.”21 Michael was also denied visitation, on the grounds that the 
law denied visitation against the wishes of the mother to a putative father who had been prevent-
ed from establishing his paternity.22  
Thus, under Michael H., the common law marital presumption of fatherhood was applied, 
and the court found that a child conceived and born during the marriage of the child’s mother to 
her husband is legally presumed to be the child of the husband. The law considered the father the 
husband, regardless of whether the husband was even with the wife at the time of conception of 
the child. This presumption could be challenged only by the wife or husband, and not by the pu-
tative father, and even then, only evidence of impotency or other rare circumstances would serve 
to rebut the presumption. Therefore, the Supreme Court followed the marital presumption, leav-
ing putative fathers facing harsh obstacles to overcome the presumption.    
1.  Reasons for & Consequences of the Presumption 
This presumption was originally created because it was believed that it would preserve the 
sanctity of marriage and promote stable marriages by preventing adulterers from breaking up 
marriages. A husband who defended his parental rights with the support of the child’s mother 
had an advantage over the natural father, as courts were inclined to protect the marital union, in-
stead of allowing a third party to potentially disturb the married couple.23 The presumption 
stemmed from the common law concept that only biological mothers, not fathers, had a right to 
bring a paternity suit, as the rights of a mother outweighed those of the father.24  Additionally, 
                                                
21 Id. at 110. 
22 Id. 
23 84 A.L.R. 4th 655 (originally published in 1991). 
24 See Hinnant, supra note 3, at 623. 




there was incentive to apply the presumption to prevent children from being “bastardized” and to 
prevent the immoral conduct of the parents from being exposed.25 
The presumption appears to focus on the best interests of the mother and married couple, in-
stead of focusing on the best interests of the child. The presumption was thought to protect socie-
ty’s desire for stability and certainty in nuclear families, possibly due to property implications 
which required clear rules on paternity and patrilineal descent.26 Additionally, Courts stated they 
were reluctant to allow putative fathers to gain rights toward children, as husbands who estab-
lished loving relationships with the children would become legal strangers and children would 
lose their father figure, with the remaining risk that a relationship between the biological father 
and child would not form.27  
Frequently, the marital presumption creates perplexing results. When a mother conceives a 
child, her husband is presumed to be the father, regardless of if her husband is actually the 
child’s biological father. This presumption even applies if the mother and husband were divorced 
at the time that the child was born.28 The presumption also applies despite the fact that the hus-
band may have no actual relationship with the child or lacks any emotional ties to that child.29  
Some would argue it is quite ludicrous that under this presumption, a biological father who 
strongly desires to have a relationship with his child would be prevented from asserting his par-
entage because the mother happened to be married at the time of the child’s birth, but divorced 
shortly thereafter with her ex-husband having no emotional or actual connection with the child 
                                                
25 Casenote, The “Lord Mansfield Rule” as to “Bastardizing the Issue,” 3 MD. L. REV. 79, 82 (1938). 
26 See Harry Willekens, Long Term Developments in Family Law in Western Europe: An Explanation, in 
The CHANGING FAMILY: INT’L PERSPECTIVE IN FAM. LAW at 52-53 (eds. John Eekelaar & Thandabantu Nhlapo, 
1998). 
27 Glennon, supra note 12, at 550-51. 
28 Hinnant, supra note 3, at 624-25.  
29 Id.   




whatsoever. This man’s existence and timing resulted in his parentage, to the exclusion of the 
actual father. 
C.  State and Secondary Source Approaches 
Secondary sources and many states have addressed the presumption. While the original pre-
sumption was valued because of the belief that it protected the integrity of the family, the change 
in laws to allow limited rebuttal has suggested that the presumption no longer serves the purpose 
it once did. Instead, it is often accepted that once a family member challenges the presumption, 
the break-up of the family has already occurred, and there is nothing left to preserve.30 Addition-
ally, advances in technology have caused some states to address the presumption and the use of 
genetic tests.31  
1.  1973 Uniform Parentage Act 
The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) was one of the first set of guidelines created for paternity 
and parentage issues, and was adopted in part or in whole by many states. Some states have 
adopted parts of the 1973 version and some have followed the 2000 version, so it is important to 
understand their provisions. 
The 1973 version of the Uniform Parentage Act was primarily intended to identify fathers of 
children born outside of wedlock for child support purposes, but it also contained sections per-
taining to children born to married mothers. This version was the first to outline procedures for 
challenging the presumption, and acknowledged evidentiary issues, including the admission of 
blood tests that might be used to rebut that presumption.32 
 Section 4 of the UPA lays forth scenarios where a presumption of paternity may be estab-
lished. It first states that a man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if he and the child’s 
                                                
30 Hinnant, supra note 3, at 625.   
31 See infra Subsection I.C.3.  
32 Glennon, supra note 12, at 555. 




mother have been married and the child is born during that marriage, or within 300 days after the 
marriage is terminated by death, annulment, divorce, or other manner.33 A man is also presumed 
to be the father if before the child’s birth, the mother and child’s natural father attempted to mar-
ry each other, even if that marriage is later determined invalid. 34A man is presumed to be the 
father if after the child’s birth, he and the child’s mother have married or attempted to marry, he 
acknowledged paternity, and is named as the father on the child’s birth certificate with his con-
sent.35 Additionally, if he receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his 
own natural child, paternity is presumed.36  
Importantly, § 4(5) of the 1973 UPA finds that paternity is presumed if a man acknowledged 
his paternity in a writing filed with the court that the mother does not dispute.37 If another man is 
presumed under the section to be the child’s father, acknowledgment of a putative father is only 
effective with the written consent of the presumed father after the putative father rebuts the pre-
sumption.38 This would prevent a putative father from establishing paternity absent the approval 
of the presumed father. 
Finally, § 4(b) states that a presumption of fatherhood may be rebutted only by clear and 
convincing evidence, and if multiple presumptions arise, the presumption which is founded on 
stronger policy and logic will control.39 The presumption is rebutted by a court decree establish-
ing paternity of the child by another man.40 
The 1973 version continues to describe that the natural mother and the man presumed to be 
the father may bring an action to declare the existence of that father-child relationship within any 
                                                
33 U.P.A. § 4(a)(1) (1973). 
34 Id. at § 4(a)(2). 
35 Id. at § 4(a)(3). 
36 Id. at § 4(a)(4). 
37 Id. at § 4(a)(5). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at § 4(b). 
40 Id. 




reasonable amount of time. However, they can only bring an action to declare the non-existence 
of that relationship after obtaining knowledge of “relevant facts” and no longer than five years 
after the birth of the child.41 Section 6(b) allows any “interested” party to bring an action, but 
only when there is no presumed father or where the presumption is based on the conduct of an 
unmarried father.42 
It is significant that the 1973 Act did not permit a putative father to bring a paternity action to 
assert his parental rights to a child born during the mother’s marriage, as § 6 only provided ways 
for the presumed father or mother to bring such an action.43 The 1973 UPA allowed actions to 
establish the non-existence of paternity in the presumed marital father, but did not state what 
type of evidence could rebut this presumption. Instead, the UPA merely stated that “clear and 
convincing” evidence was required, and later vaguely referred to blood tests as available evi-
dence, with language that was so unclear that states have not uniformly adopted this part of the 
code.44 In sum, the 1973 UPA did not afford a putative father an opportunity to bring a paternity 
action, and left confusing instructions on how to establish the non-existence of fatherhood by the 
marital parent. 
2.  2000 UPA 
The UPA was modified in 2000, but drafters still did not provide much resolution to a pre-
sumption of paternity conflict, as the 2000 version relied heavily on the 1973 version, and failed 
to create consistency amongst the states.45  
 UPA § 201 states that a father-child relationship is established upon an un-rebutted presump-
tion of a man’s paternity; effective acknowledgement of paternity by the man unless acknowl-
                                                
41 Id. at § 6. 
42 Id. at § 6(b); See Glennon, supra note 12, at 566-68. 
43 Glennon, supra note 12, at 566-68. 
44 See id. 
45 Id. at  658-59. 




edgment has been rescinded; adjudication of a man’s paternity; adoption of a child; the man’s 
consent to assisted reproduction by a woman; or adjudication confirming a man as a parent of a 
child born to a gestational mother.46 
UPA § 204 states that a man is presumed to be the father of a child if he and the mother are 
married and the child is born during the marriage; he and the mother were married to each other 
and the child was born within 300 days after the marriage was terminated by death, annulment, 
declaration of invalidity, or divorce; if before the birth of the child, he and the mother marry each 
other and the child is born during the invalid marriage or within 300 days after its termination; or 
if after birth, he and the mother marry each other in compliance with the law and the assertion of 
parentage is in a record filed with the state agency maintaining birth records and the man agrees 
to be and is named the child’s father on the birth certificate or he promised in record to support 
the child as his own.47 
Finally, under § 607 of the UPA, a proceeding brought by the presumed father, mother, or 
another individual to adjudicate parentage when a presumed father exists must be commenced no 
longer than two years after the child’s birth.48 A proceeding seeking to disprove a father-child 
relationship between a child and the child’s presumed father may be maintained at any time if the 
court determines that the presumed father and mother neither cohabitated nor engaged in sexual 
intercourse during the probable time of conception and the presumed father never openly held 
out the child as his own.49 
The 2000 version acknowledges unmarried fathers only through written acknowledgment of 
paternity or through legal action brought against them to establish paternity. Unmarried fathers 
                                                
46 U.P.A. § 201 (2000). 
47 Id. at § 204. 
48 Id. at § 607. 
49 Id. 




can no longer be presumed a father by taking a child into his home as was the case in the 1973 
version. 
 The 2000 Act still doesn’t provide guidance in a paternity conflict between a biological 
father and a husband in an action brought within two years of the child’s birth. The presumed 
father can estopp the putative father from requesting genetic testing if a court determines that the 
conduct of the mother or presumed father would make it inequitable to dis-establish that relation-
ship.50 As estoppel is an issue that is fact-based and differs amongst jurisdictions, the UPA did 
not provide clear guidance to resolve this presumption issue.51 The court determines the best in-
terest of the child, and has discretion to deny any type of genetic testing. If the action is brought 
over two years from the child’s birth, the presumed father’s paternity can’t be contested by any-
one, even the presumed father.  
In sum, the 2000 version relaxes the common law marital presumption as laid out in Michael 
H, because it at least gives the putative father the opportunity to rebut the martial presumption. 
However, the putative father would have to prove that the presumed father and mother didn’t co-
habit or engage in sexual intercourse during the probable time of conception.52 This could be 
hard to prove, as the parties need to simply lie to get around this. The 2000 version brings some 
gains and losses for unmarried fathers: they lose the right to become a presumed father by devel-
oping a relationship with the child and holding the child out as their own, but are now permitted 
to bring an action to assert parentage to children born to married mothers, though the restrictions 
and conditions on this right are numerous.53 
                                                
50 Glennon, supra note 12, at 570-71. 
51 See id. 
52 U.P.A. § 607 (2000). 
53 See id. at 568-69. 




3.  State Approaches 
The circumstances in which the marital presumption may be rebutted vary drastically 
amongst and even within the states. Varying factors include the identity of the party bringing the 
suit, the timing of the action, marital status of the mother and presumed father, and promises 
made or actions performed by the presumed or putative father.54 Many states have passed stat-
utes that give putative fathers potential opportunities to establish paternity, providing some relief 
from the marital presumption of paternity and extending the circumstances in which the pre-
sumption can be rebutted. These states express the belief that biological ties are an adequate ba-
sis for both parental responsibility and the only basis for legal father-child relationships that will 
withstand court challenge.55 Initially, states did this for the purpose of collecting child support 
from unwed fathers, but additionally expanded the categories of people who could challenge the 
presumption and the circumstances in which those people could be successful.56  
Currently, over thirty states allow a man to rebut the marital presumption, as long as the ac-
tion is commenced within two years of the child’s birth and various criteria are met.57 Some 
states enacted the entire UPA, while others enacted only parts of the UPA.58 Notably, the UPA 
doesn’t cover all aspects of parentage, so there are still discrepancies among the states that adopt 
it. Courts in California have held that a putative father has no standing to sue intact families to 
assert paternity rights, but other UPA states (like Colorado and Texas) have held that a putative 
father has a constitutional right to challenge paternity in this situation.59  
                                                
54 Id. at 568. 
55 Id. at 550. 
56 Id. 









Due to changing societal mores and advancements in technology and genetic testing ma-
terial to determine paternity, the UPA’s revised version was adopted in several states, including 
Delaware, Texas, Washington and Wyoming, and it was recently introduced in California, Illi-
nois, Maine and Utah (where it died in the State Legislature).60  Some states with similar genetic 
testing provisions hold that scientific evidence of paternity creates a presumption of paternity, 
which would allow a putative father to establish paternity and rebut the presumption through a 
mere test.61 Other states with similar genetic testing provisions refuse to allow putative fathers to 
assert paternity by genetic testing where the presumption exists.62  In those states where genetic 
evidence is not treated as a conclusive presumption of paternity, courts are left to decide if re-
sults of genetic testing are enough to rebut the presumption, or if other factors, including the best 
interests of the child, would prevent the presumption from being rebutted. Courts thus have little 
guidance in this area, and are often guided by assumptions about parenthood.63 
In sum, many states have modified the common law presumption to alleviate some of the 
burden putative fathers face when trying to challenge paternity. However, there is much incon-
sistency among and even within states and courts have been provided with no clear direction. 
Even courts with similar statutes come to drastically different conclusions regarding when rebut-
tal of the presumption is appropriate.64 While some states might provide relief for putative fa-
thers, generally, putative fathers are given few chances to establish paternity of their biological 
child because of the lingering marital presumption.  
                                                
60 Id. 
61 Glennon, supra note 12, at 568.  
62 Deborah A. Ellingboe, Sex, Lies, and Genetic Tests: Challenging the Marital Presumption of Paternity 
Under the Minnesota Parentage Act, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1013, 1044 (1994). 
63 Glennon, supra note 12, at 568. 
64 Id. 




II.  MICHIGAN LAW  
A.  Michigan Law before June 2012 
Before June of 2012, Michigan putative fathers had an extremely difficult time attempting to 
establish paternity of a child, because Michigan law followed the common law presumption that 
a child who was conceived and born during a marriage is the child of the mother’s husband.65 
The mother’s husband was considered the “presumed father,” and to rebut the presumption that 
the child was the issue of the husband, a putative father had to prove that the child was “born out 
of wedlock” by clear and convincing evidence.66  
A child born out of wedlock was defined to be a child “begotten and born to a woman who 
was not married from the conception to the date of birth of the child, or a child that the court has 
determined to be a child born or conceived during a marriage but not the issue of that mar-
riage.”67  
To prove that the child was born out of wedlock, a putative father would need to show that 
the mother and husband were not married for the entire period from conception to the birth of the 
child.68  Alternatively, the putative father could show that a judicial determination was previous-
ly entered stating that the child was not an issue of the marriage.69 Unless there had been a court 
determination, a putative father would have to prove that the mother and husband were divorced 
during the entire course of the pregnancy, not just any period during the pregnancy for the child 
to be born “out of wedlock.”  
In sum, before June of 2012, putative fathers could only overcome the marital presumption 
by showing that the child was born out of wedlock, which was a very difficult task. 
                                                
65 In re KH, 677 N.W.2d 800, 801 (Mich. 2004). 
66 Girard v. Wagenmaker, 470 N.W.2d 372, 376 (Mich. 1991). 
67 Id. at 242; MICH. COMP. LAW § 722.711(a). 
68 Aichele v. Hodge, 259 Mich. App 146, 154, 156 (2003). 
69 Id. 




B.  Michigan Law after June’s 2012 Revocation of Paternity Act 
A recent change in Michigan Law has drastically altered the opportunities for putative fa-
thers to attempt to establish paternity of children.70 The Michigan Legislature passed the Revoca-
tion of Paternity Act (RPA), effective as of June 12, 2002, which includes provisions that allow a 
putative father to attempt to establish paternity in certain situations despite the fact that the 
mother of that child is married to a different man.71 The RPA modifies the presumption that a 
husband is the father of all of his wife’s children born during their marriage, and despite the 
mother’s marriage, the paternity of the presumed father may be set aside, and a putative father 
may seek an order of filiation (a declaration of parentage).72 
Under the RPA, an alleged father may seek an order of filiation by proving by clear and 
convincing evidence that he is the child’s father.73 Under section 11 of the RPA (now codified in 
MCL § 722.1441), a putative father has the option to file an action to determine that a presumed 
father is not the child’s father and to establish his own paternity.74  There are three different sce-
narios in which a putative father may take this action. Under the first scenario, the putative father 
must show that he did not know or did not have reason to know that the mother was married at 
the time of conception; the presumed father, putative father, and mother at some point in time 
must mutually and openly acknowledge a biological relationship between the putative father and 
                                                
70  2012 Mich. Pub. Acts 159 available at http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2011-
2012/publicact/pdf/2012-PA-0160.pdf; MCL 722.1441. The case that inspired the Michigan legislature to pass this 
act was that of Daniel Quinn, a Michigan man who sought custody of his child for five years. Jessica Harthorn, 
Fenton father Dan Quinn one step closer in updating Michigan’s Paternity Act, MINBCNEWS.COM (April 12, 2011), 
http://www.minbcnews.com/news/story.aspx?id=604746#.UYHM2oLpwXw. He had a child with a woman who 
claimed to be married at the time. Id. He then lived with the mother and child for three years, raising the child, until 
the mother abruptly returned to live with her estranged husband and prevented Daniel from seeing his child. Id. 
Despite the fact that the child was at one point placed into foster care, Daniel has not been able to establish standing 
to fight for custody. Id. 
71  2012 Mich. Pub. Acts 159 available at http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2011-








the child; and the action must be filed within three years of the child’s birth for the the putative 
father to file to establish paternity.75  All three elements must be satisfied. 
Alternatively, if the putative father did not know or have reason to know the mother was 
married at the time of conception and the presumed father has failed to provide support for the 
child for two years before the filing of the action, has not complied with a support order, or the 
child is less than three years of age and the presumed father lives separately and apart from the 
child, the putative father may file to establish paternity.76   
Finally, the putative father may show that the mother was not married at the time of con-
ception and if the action is filed within three years of the child’s birth, then the putative father 
may file to establish paternity.77 These are all ways to bring a paternity action that were not 
available under previous Michigan law, although they still may be hard to meet. 
However, even if one of these three scenarios are met, § 722.1443 of the RPA goes on to 
state that a court may refuse to enter an order to set aside a paternity determination if the court 
finds evidence that the order would not be in the best interests of the child.78 The child’s best in-
terests include whether the presumed father is estopped from denying parentage because of his 
conduct, the length of time the presumed father was on notice that he might not be the child’s 
father, the facts surrounding the presumed father’s discovery that he might not be the child’s fa-
ther, the relationship between the presumed or alleged father, the age of the child, the harm that 
could result to the child, and “any other factor that the court determines appropriate to consid-
er.”79 
                                                
75 M.C.L. § 722.1441(3)(a). 
76 Id. at § 722.1441(3)(b). 
77 Id. at § 722.1441(3)(c).  
78 Id. at § 722.1443(4). 
79 Id. See Lori T. Williams, New Rights for Fathers Under the Michigan Paternity Act, BIRMINGHAMPATCH  
(March 19, 2013), http://birmingham.patch.com/blog_posts/new-rights-for-fathers-under-the-michigan-paternity-act.  





III.  ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS WITH MICHIGAN’S RPA 
 Although the RPA finally provides an opportunity for putative fathers to establish pater-
nity, the strict requirements that must be met under the Act realistically give fathers little oppor-
tunity to bring a paternity action. Michigan belatedly followed the lead of other states in making 
it easier for a putative father to rebut the marital presumption, but the proof and factors that the 
putative fathers must establish impose too high of a burden. 
A.  RPA Provision Problems 
Two of the three scenarios by which a putative father may bring an action require the puta-
tive father to have no knowledge or no reason to have knowledge that the mother was married.80  
This is likely a hard condition for a putative father to meet. If the actual father and the mother 
were in a relationship and conceived a child, it is likely that he would know of her marital status. 
This provision is essentially only allowing standing for putative fathers if the relationship that 
resulted in the conception of the child was a “one night stand.” Only then does it seem likely that 
the putative father would not know that the mother of his child is married. There certainly might 
be times when the child’s mother misrepresents herself to the child’s father, but it seems unlikely 
that this will frequently be the case. 
The RPA also allows a putative father to make a claim if the biological father, mother, and 
putative father all sign an agreement acknowledging that the putative father, not the husband, is 
the father.81 This also fails to give the putative father relief. The old act already gave the mother 
and husband standing to rebut the presumption as well as the ability to mutually agree that some-
one else is the father, so the RPA is really adding no new right for the putative father. The prob-
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lem remains when the husband does not wish to give up paternity, where it would be unlikely for 
the husband to sign such an acknowledgment. Unless the husband wants no obligation to support 
the child, it seems unlikely that the child’s mother and her husband would acknowledge by 
agreement another man’s paternity. 
One scenario under the RPA by which a putative father may challenge paternity requires that 
the putative father demonstrate that the presumed father was not paying support for the child.82  
It seems unlikely that a putative father would have any knowledge of how financially supportive 
the presumed father is and hard to imagine how a putative father could prove this. Unless the 
mother’s husband has publicly deserted her, there appear to be few circumstances that would sat-
isfy this scenario. 
The three-year time frame for a putative father to bring a claim is a requirement that is simi-
lar to those found in other states. But if a biological parent has no idea that the child was born, 
why should he be punished for failing to bring a claim sooner if he didn’t know that he had a 
claim? A mother’s failure to inform the father of the child shouldn’t bar the putative father’s op-
portunity to petition for paternity.  
Finally, the “best interests” provision of MCL 722.1443 allows the court to refuse to set aside 
a presumed father’s paternity even when the putative father has satisfied the other criterion of the 
RPA. This gives the court wide discretion to refuse an order based on whatever the “court deter-
mines appropriate to consider,”83 and permits the court to completely thwart the ability of a puta-
tive father to establish paternity. While it is often appropriate for a court to consider a child’s 
best interests, the RPA already does consider a child’s interests by making it extremely difficult 
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for a putative father to even have standing to bring an action,84 and this provision simply gives 
the courts a tool to punish adulterers by withholding parental rights.  
While the RPA offers three scenarios for the presumption to be rebutted, all of them contain 
provisions that will be very hard for a putative father to demonstrate.85 The RPA technically 
makes the presumption easier to rebut, but in actuality its conditions render the burden almost as 
difficult for a putative father to meet as the former act. 
B.  Theoretical Problems with the Presumption 
The presumption frequently prevents an actual biological parent of a child from establish-
ing parental rights, as most states have retained the presumption, with exceptions that offer little 
relief to putative fathers who wish to rebut the presumption. Parents have constitutionally pro-
tected parental rights, usually care, custody, and control.86  Yet under the presumption, biological 
parents are prohibited from enjoying these parental rights. The question becomes who is a parent, 
and who actually gets these rights? It is hard to understand how a biological parent can be barred 
from asserting any rights over the child because of a common law presumption that no longer 
serves the purposes it was designed to serve.  
Modern technology has advanced to a point where genetic tests can determine with al-
most absolute certainty the identity of a child’s biological father. 87 Before, there might have 
been worries that marriages should not be disrupted when technology might incorrectly find a 
child to be the child of a putative father. This risk of inaccuracy is far less likely, as technology 
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has advanced to a point where errors are rare, but these genetic advancements have not been re-
flected in the law. 88 
 Societal norms have changed, as the nuclear family is becoming less common, and more 
children are born out of wedlock or to a single parent.89 While it may not be considered ideal, it 
is also not as uncommon for a married woman to have a child with another man. While it is un-
derstandable that earlier courts wanted to protect the sanctity of marriage, society itself does not 
view marriage the same way that marriage was viewed under the common law, and it would not 
be unconscionable to society to acknowledge the actual father of a child, even if that father was 
outside of the marriage. 
IV.  SOLUTIONS 
A.   Solutions to RPA 
The RPA should be modified to allow putative fathers a real opportunity to rebut the marital 
presumption. The provision requiring that the putative father have no knowledge of the mother’s 
marital status should be removed, as that requirement alone would stop a great number of poten-
tial actions. A putative father can’t be faulted for not knowing the marital status of a woman with 
whom he conceived a child when he still wishes to play a role in that child’s life.  
The three-year time limitation should also be extended, or should not toll until  
the putative father is aware of the child’s birth.  Currently, the RPA imposes the three-year time 
limitation needed to bring forth an action, but if the mother does not inform the putative father of 
her pregnancy or the child’s birth, the putative father may not be on notice to challenge the 
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child’s paternity.90 The idea of limiting it to three years is perhaps important to ensure that a fam-
ily or child’s life isn’t disrupted because of the putative father’s delay in bringing an action. 
However, because the right to bring an action means nothing if the putative father is unaware of 
the child’s existence, there should be a qualification that the putative father must have notice for 
this two year limitation to apply.  
It would not be difficult for the mother to provide proof of notice, as the mother could 
show records of letters or phone calls, so the burden of showing that notice was given should be 
on her. Otherwise, if the putative father brings an action over three years after the child’s birth 
and the mother cannot provide evidence that she notified the putative father about the child’s ex-
istence, then the putative father should not be barred from bringing the action. 
Admittedly, it may not be practical for a putative father to bring a claim many years after 
a child’s birth. If the putative father received no notice of the birth until the child was a teenager, 
it would perhaps be disruptive to that child if the putative father were permitted to establish pa-
rental rights at such a late stage in the child’s life. At the very least, an older child could make his 
own decision as to the role the putative father will have in that child’s life. An older child has 
some discretion in how he would interact with the putative father, as an older child’s preference 
is typically given weight with courts.91 Accordingly, if a putative father established parental 
rights when the child was a teenager and the teenager wanted nothing to do with the putative fa-
ther, a judge would probably give great weight to the child’s custody and parenting time prefer-
ences, and the putative father’s actual role in the child’s life would be limited. If the presumption 
was rebutted when the child was still young, then the possible disruption may be minimized. It is 
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difficult to arbitrarily determine an age after which a putative father would be prohibited from 
bringing a claim, but a notice requirement might encourage the mother to take steps to ensure 
that any disruption occurred early in the child’s life. 
Finally, the power of the court to refuse to issue an order under MCL 722.1443 is unnec-
essarily harsh and should be eliminated. The provision gives the courts too much power to reject 
a putative father’s attempt to establish paternity. If the putative father has already fulfilled the 
difficult task of earning standing under MCL 722.1441, he should not be stopped from continu-
ing with his action simply because a court finds that “other factors” would make the action inap-
propriate.92 Most of the best interest factors listed by the court are already encompassed in other 
provisions of the act,93 and the provision simply allows courts to deny claims based on disdain 
for adulterers. 
 While some of the RPA components themselves are problematic, the marital presumption 
itself should be reformed. 
B.   Broader Solutions 
All states that rebut the marital presumption do so with varying restrictions and limitations, 
creating inconsistencies amongst the states and a lack of guidance for courts to work with. There 
may be some solutions that could benefit not just Michigan, but all states. 
Subsection IV.B.1: Bright- Line Rule – Genetic Test Rebuts Presumption 
The legislature could step in to create a bright-line standard to be applied to all of the states. 
As society has evolved, marital norms have changed, and technology has improved, paternity 
establishment and the marital presumption have become a point of conflict and uncertainty 
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among the states.94 The Legislature could address the issue and lay forth a clear rule regarding 
the standing of putative fathers, so that states don’t have to independently and individually come 
to their own conclusions. This would also eliminate a case-by-case inquiry. 
If a bright line rule were to be established, it seems appropriate that a putative father should 
be permitted to rebut the martial presumption by a mere genetic test showing that he is the bio-
logical father. As genetic tests are now capable of determining paternity at an accuracy rate of 
99.9 percent,95 the validity of a finding could be assumed. Instead of having to prove the difficult 
provisions of the RPA or other similar state statutes, a genetic finding that the putative father is 
the biological father could immediately and on its own rebut the presumption, and allow the pu-
tative father to assert parental rights. A finding that genetic proof of parentage automatically re-
buts the marital presumption would be easy for courts to apply, would be consistent with the 
changing mores of society, and would prevent the biological father from the unjust situation of 
not being permitted to assert any parental rights to his child.  
Subsection IV.B.2: Rule would Better Comport with Today’s Norms of Marriage 
There is no longer a pressing need to protect the sanctity of marriage, when the definitions 
and views of marriage that motivated the presumption during the common law years no longer 
exist.96 Instead of strictly the nuclear family, many different types of families are now accepted, 
including families with multiple parents or same-sex parents. The nuclear family is less common 
than it used to be, and many people choose not to marry or have children as a single parent.97 In 
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fact, twenty-five percent of American children are born to a single parent.98 As many more chil-
dren are born out of wedlock, it is no longer true that a child born out of wedlock is viewed as a 
“bastard,” which was one of the incentives for the original rule.99 As one commentator noted, 
“[what] once used to be called illegitimacy . . . now [] is the new normal.”100 Because societal 
norms recognize many different types of families, the sanctity of the marital nuclear family is not 
the same as it once was, meaning the presumption no longer serves the purpose it once did. A 
finding that biological proof that a putative father is the father would not be offensive to the 
modern day conception of the family, and would not threaten stable families in a world where 
the concept of family has already been turned upside down. 
Subsection IV.B.3: All Could Play Parental Role 
If a putative father is allowed to dispute and establish paternity, this doesn’t necessarily mean 
the husband would have to dissociate himself from the child, as courts have held that this parent 
may still have legal parental rights.  The law is increasingly recognizing that a child can have 
more than two parents.101 Different theories of social parenting have been accepted by courts, 
where a third parent can establish legal rights based on his or her action and interaction with a 
child.102 As courts have recognized three parents in some cases, this could extend to this situation, 
with the mother, presumed father, and putative father all having parental rights and duties to the 
child.  
Other theories have been recognized by the courts that could be implicated to ensure that a 
presumed father maintains some parental rights. An increasing number of courts have recognized 
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that legal parental relationships may be established based on functional relationships or on the 
intent of the parties, and that biology is not the only way to establish parenthood.103 In some cas-
es, courts have relied on the doctrine of in loco parentis to grant a husband or ex-husband custo-
dy or joint custody of a child born during the marriage, even if that child was not the natural off-
spring of the husband or ex-husband.104 Courts have also found that a husband may become the 
psychological parent of his wife’s child, who was later proven to be not his child.105 Finally, 
some jurisdictions have recognized the equitable parent doctrine, which supports a presumed fa-
ther’s request for visitation rights to a child that he erroneously believed was his.106 These doc-
trines all suggest that courts are willing to recognize some form of parental rights for a father (in 
this case the husband), who erroneously believed the child was his. This would mean that while a 
genetic test’s paternity results would give the putative father parental rights, this does not neces-
sarily mean that the presumed father would lose all rights. 
At the very least, a putative father should be permitted to play the role of another parent in-
stead of limiting a child to two parents, leaving the putative father on the outside. However, 
courts are increasingly willing to recognize multiple parents, and already existing theories and 
doctrines could play a role to ensure all play a role in the child’s life.   
Subsection IV.B.4: Rule would Result in Child-Oriented Approach  
Allowing the putative father to establish parenthood upon a genetic establishment would help 
guide this area of family law to a more child-oriented approach. Applying the presumption may 
not be in the children’s best interests, but that is not a factor that courts or statues have seemed to 
consider. It may be in the child’s best interests to have a relationship with their biological parent 
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and experience the biological bond. Previously, courts and states seemed to put the marital rela-
tionship above the interests of the child, but this would put the child’s back into focus. Of course, 
it could be argued that giving the putative father parental rights would be disruptive to the child, 
but in all likelihood, the rebuttal of this presumption would happen early in the child’s life, the 
court would consider an older child’s preferences in making custody determinations, and the pre-
sumed father would still have some form of parental rights with the child as well.107 Even if 
courts are reluctant to give the presumed father parental rights after granting the putative father 
parental rights, if the presumed father is still with the mother then he won’t be ripped out of the 
child’s life. If he is no longer with the mother, then this is just further justification that the pre-
sumption shouldn’t operate to prevent the biological father from asserting rights if the marital 
union no longer exists. This approach considers the biological father’s perspective, instead of 
just the biological mother’s.  
  CONCLUSION 
 Since the 1700’s, the putative father has encountered a difficult, if not impossible, task in 
attempting to establish paternity and gain parental rights of his or her child, due to the common 
law marital presumption. While some states have backed away from the presumption, most states 
still require putative fathers to satisfy complicated criterion to have the opportunity to rebut the 
presumption. Michigan has finally created some ways in which a putative father may rebut the 
presumption with the Revocation of Paternity Act, but until some provisions the Act are changed, 
putative fathers will still have an uphill battle when it comes to establishing paternity. Putative 
fathers would benefit from the elimination or modification of the marital presumption nation-
wide, as a bright-line rule finding genetic testing enough to rebut the presumption would go far 
to alleviate the impossible burden currently faced by putative fathers. 
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